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Who Is Injured when_Racially Discriminatory
Private Schools are Tax-Exempt?
by Neal Devins

Allen v. Wright
(Docket No. 81-757)

Regan v. Wright
(Docket No. 81-970)
To be argued February 29, 1984
ISSUE
The decision in Bob jones University v. United States did
not quiet the controversy over tax exemptions for private schools. Instead, the Supreme Court's 1983 ruling
that racially discriminatory private schools are not entitled to tax-exempt status merely paved the way for more
intricate litigation contouring racial nondiscrimination
enforcement standards. Regan v. Wright is a nationwide
class action suit instituted by black parents and their
schoolage children in an effort to force the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to adopt more stringent nondiscrimination standards. The issue now before the Supreme Court, however, is a procedural one: whether
this particular class has an interest in racial nondiscrimination which satisfies the "standing to sue" requirements.
Article III of the Constitution establishes the basics
fo,· the judicial power of federal courts and provides
that the limited federal power extends only to certain
qualified "case or controversies." Also, standing is an
essential prerequisite to an article III case or controversy, and without it, the federal courts are constitutionally unable to act. The standing doctrine is premised on
the fundamental separation of powers notion that legislative choices should be made by legislative machinerynot by the judiciary. In this way, standing prevents a
plaintiff from using "a federal court as a forum in which
to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government." (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 ( 1968))
Regan v. Wright touches on three specific aspects of
the standing doctrine. First, since the parents and children here have no interest in attending (and have not
sought admission to) allegedly racially discriminatory
private schools, Regan will determine whether a black
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person suffers the requisite .. direct and concrete injury"
when the government grants tax-exempt statrls to racially discriminatory private schools. Second, since denial of tax-exempt status might not affect the policies of
allegedly discriminatory private schools, Regan will determine whether the rights of blacks are vindicated
merely by the government's .. steering clear" of racially
discriminatory institutions. Third, Regan will determine
whether prudential separation of powers concerns
should prevent the judiciary from imposing standards
on a matter already addressed by the IRS.
FACTS
Regan v. Wright is an appeal by the secretary of treasury and parent of a child attending an allegedly discriminatory private school from a 1981 decision by the
D.C. court of appeals. That decision gave black parents
and schoolchildren an absolute right to challenge IRS
policies governing the tax-exempt status of private
schools. (Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (1981))
The Regan lawsuit is a nationwide class action initiated in 1976 by black parents and schoolchildren seeking more expansive nondiscrimination enforcement
standards to govern the tax-exempt status of private
schools. In an effort to settle the case, the IRS proposed
nondiscrimination enforcement standards in 1978
which-in accord with the relief sought in Reganwould have denied racial nondiscrimination through a
numerical quota based on areawide black/white student
population ratios. Congress, however, prohibited these
procedures through appropriations riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 1980. In the meantime, the
case was working its way through the D.C. district court.
In November of 1978, that court held that plaintiffs
Jacked standing to sue. However, in june, 1981, the D.C.
court of appeals reversed that decision. In May, 1983,
(immediately following the Supreme Court's Bob .Jones
University decision), the Supreme Court agreed to review
the appellate court decision.
The court of appeals decision adopted the position
that the black parents and children, as members of the
group subjected to discrimination, had standing to sue
to enforce the government's constitutional obligation to
steer clear of aiding institutions that practice racial discrimination. In support of this holding, plaintiffs in
Regan argue that 'just as government injures black
schoolchildren when it operates a segregated system of
education, it injures those children when it gives signifi-
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cant aid to private discriminatory schools, especially
those organized or expanded concurrently with desegregation." (See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973)) Consequently, the parents and children suing in
this case contend that it is irrelevant that they have not
been denied admission to any private school.
The government responds that the "right to be free
of government aid to racial discrimination is an undifferentiated right common to all members of the public
that will not support standing to sue treasury officials in
an article Ill court." (See, e.g., United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974)) This governmental position is surfacely in accord with the Supreme Court's 1982 decision
in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State ( 102 S.Ct. 752 ( 1982) ).
According to the Court in Valley Forge, "the psychological consequences presumably produced by observation
of conduct with which one disagrees'' is not "an injury
sufficient to confer standing under article Ill, even
though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional
terms." (102 S.Ct. at 765) The parents and children in
this case refute this contention, arguing that they are
especially harmed by the racially discriminatory conduct
of government.
The appellate court decision also granted standing
over the government's contention that the plaintiffs
failed to stake a claim which could be adequately relieved. The government argued that adopting the proposed nondiscrimination standards might very well have
the effect of private schools foregoing their tax-exempt
status (rather than comply with the standards proposed). The government thus argued that Regan was
quite similar to the situation faced by the Supreme
Court in its 1976 decision, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization (426 U.S. 26 (1976)). Eastern
Kentucky denied standing to indigents who complained
they were being denied medical treatment by hospitals
that were accorded tax-exempt status. The Supreme
Court reasoned that it was "purely speculative" to think
that a change in IRS guidelines would result in concomitant change in hospital policy.
Black plaintiffs in Regan respond to this argument by
noting that their claim is not based on an allegation that
current IRS policies effectively limit their rights to attend desegrated public schools. They instead suggest
that the injury suffered is that their race is denigrated
through government support of racial discrimination.
Consequently, plaintiffs claim that effective nondiscrimination enforcement standards will relieve them of
their government-imposed injury regardless of the effect of such procedures on the policies of private
schools.
The court of appeals decision in Regan also held that
judicial imposition of nondiscrimination enforcement
standards would not violate the principle of separation
of powers. Noting that a temporary injunction issued in

this case by the court of appeals prevented the Reagan
administration from implementing its announced policy
of granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools, black plaintiffs stress that: "The history
of this case makes plain that, unless the victims of unlawful government aid to private discrimination have standing to complain of the injury inflicted by such
government aid, Brown's promise of equal opportunity is
hollow."
In response to this argument, the government suggests that the courts lack authority to serve as "continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of executive
action." For the government: "The questions of revenue
enforcement policy raised by respondents' suit are properly a matter of public debate. By that means, the views
of interested persons and organizations may be ventilated and taken into account." On this score, the government notes that congressional and public opposition to
the IRS proposal in 1978 during the Carter presidency,
was so severe that appropriations riders were passed to
prohibit such strict standards.
Supreme Court resolution of Regan will involve the
same issues presented to the appellate court: 1) whether
plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury; 2) whether
meaningful relief can be granted, and 3) whether prudential separation of powers concerns will prohibit judicial imposition of enforcement standards.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Regan v. Wright is a significant case on a number of
levels. Of foremost importance, if the Supreme Court
grants standing, the judiciary will have authority to promulgate specific nondiscrimination enforcement standards for tax-exemption organizations. The Bob jones
University decision did not impose standards; it merely
held that racially discriminatory private schools will not
be afforded tax breaks.
To many observers, the possibility of judicial imposition of such standards is troublesome. They argue that
IRS policy is properly based in Congress and the Executive branch. Although these popularly elected
branches of government should abide by constitutional
standards, matters of statutory tax policy should not be
subject to judicial interference. In the specific context of
tax-exemptions to racially discriminatory private
schools, Congress-through the passage of appropriations riders-has explicitly indicated its disapproval of
standards similar to those proffered by the plaintiffs in
Regan.

Some critics also feel that judicial interposition on
this matter is also problematic because Congress and the
!RS ar~ ~nstitu~ionally better equipped to make tax polICY decisiOns. Fmally, court-based policy decisions take a
long time. The private school tax-exemption issue has
been in ~he c~urts for fifteen years. And if standing is
granted m thts case, the issue will probably stay in th("
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courts for three to five more years.
All of this, of course, - the time and sensitivity
involved in deciding such a case - should not prevent
the courts from addressing an issue which is properly
within their jurisdiction. In fact, profound changes
which occur through Supreme Court decisions can and
must take place in such troubled atmospheres.
Regan v. Wright is also significant outside of the taxexemption context. If the claim of denigration of the
race is accepted, blacks will be permitted a special entree
into the courts when some government policy is at odds
with the national value of racial nondiscrimination. Although blacks are especially interested in government
nondiscrimination, this constitutional value is a right
shared by the entire population. Fundamental separation of powers concerns (embodied in the standing doctrine) should not give way to the claims of special
interest groups.
At the same time, blacks are considered the "injured
party" in school desegregation lawsuits- and blacks are
undeniably the realistically injured parties when schools
are desegregated.
On a broad social level, a strong argument could be
made that the numerical quota standards proffered by
plaintiffs in Regan should become part of our tax laws.
In many areas, private schools have served as a means
for white children to avoid local desegregation. (The
great majority of private schools, however, could not
fairly be called ''segregation academies.") Yet, it is not
for the courts to interpose statutory standards which
contradict the apparent will of Congress.
At this juncture, Regan does not call on the Supreme
Court to develop or approve nondiscrimination enforcement standards. (The ability of courts to fashion a remedy is a component of the standing doctrine, however.)
Yet, the Supreme Court is asked in Regan to grant blacks
a special right to ensure that our government abides by a
policy of racial nondiscrimination. On the on~ hand,
blacks have been victimized by illegal segregatiOn. On
the other hand, none of the black plaintiffs in Regan
have been directly or specifically victimized by any allegedly discriminatory private schools.
Striking this balance, with its myriad implications,
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will make Regan a very important Supreme Court decision.
ARGUMENTS

For Black Plaintiffs
1. The government's grant of tangible financial aid to
private, racially discriminatory schools formed or expanded in plaintiffs' communities at the initiation of
public school desegregation infringes plaintiffs' personal rights to equal educational opportunity,_
2. Whether or not any private schools change their policies as a consequence of government adoption of the
proposed standards, the injury here should be redressed because the government has ·'steered clear"
of aiding racial discrimination.
For the Government
1. Plaintiffs' allegation that the government provides
tangible aid to racially discriminatory institutions establishes no "injury in fact," but only a generalized
grievance with government policy.
2. Plaintiffs' allegation that the government interferes
with their right to equal education opportunity is not
redressable in court since the practices of private
schools cannot be fairly traced to government action.
3. Prudential separation of powers concerns prohibit
judicial action on this issue.
(W. Wayne Allen, a parent of a student attending an
allegedly discriminatory private school, intervened in
this case and made arguments identical to the government. Allen also suggested that the proposed standards
were not a fair test for racial nondiscrimination.)
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
The NAACP filed an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs which contained arguments identical to those
of plaintiffs.
The United States Catholic Conference filed a brief
in support of the government. This brief stressed
prudential separation of powers limitations on judicial
action and also urged that government benefits
accorded private schools through tax-exempt status
would be nullified should the proposed standards be
adopted.
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